

APP comments on Draft CERC (Deviation Settlement Mechanism and Related Matters) Regulations, 2024	4
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S.no	Clause as per Draft Regulation	APP Comments
1.	Clause 5 – Adherence to Schedule and Deviation (1) For the secure and stable operation of the grid, every grid-connected regional entity shall adhere to its schedule as per the Grid Code and shall endeavour not to deviate from its schedule. (2) Deviation shall generally be managed through the deployment of Ancillary Services, and the computation, charges, and related matters in respect of such deviation shall be dealt with as per the following provisions of these regulations.	It is quite unrealistic for generating stations connected with grid to adhere exactly to scheduled generation without any deviation. Further, in the case of power plants with integrated coal mines which use high energy intensive equipment, the power supply to the mines forms part of auxiliary consumption of the plant. This power consumption varies instantaneously as per operational requirements of mines to accommodate quality of incoming coal and results in variation in net energy export the power plant and thus maintaining constant load is technically not possible. In view of uncontrollable nature of the abovementioned situations, it would not be appropriate to keep frequency as the only consideration for DSM and therefore it is requested that a penalty free deviation band may be considered.



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2.	Clause 8 – Charges for Deviation (1) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a general seller other than an RoR generating station or a generating station based on municipal solid waste or WS seller shall be as under:	The charges for deviation, as outlined in Clause 8, do not incentivize the generators for contributing to grid security and stability. Not only is there a big difference between the deviation charges receivable and payable by the Seller during similar scenarios, but the
	Deviation by way of over injection (For Deviation up to $[10\% D_{GS} \text{ or } 100 \text{ MW}, \text{ whichever is less}])$	deviation charges do not allow even the recovery of fuel cost.In view of various technical constraints when
	(1)(i) @ RR when $f = 50.00 \text{ Hz}$ (1)(ii) When [50.00 Hz < $f \le 50.05 \text{ Hz}$], for every increase in f by 0.01 Hz, charges for deviation for such seller shall be reduced by 10% of RR so that charges for deviation become 50% of RR when f = 50.05Hz (1)(iii) When [49.90 $\le f < 50.00 \text{ Hz}$], for every decrease in f by 0.01 Hz, charges for deviation for such seller shall be increased by 1.5% of RR so that charges for deviation become 115% of RR when f	maintaining fixed load is not possible, generators have to bear the extra burden of fuel cost without any DSM gain and the financial impact on the generating stations is huge. The situation will further deteriorate with varying grid frequency in each block, which is also a contributing factor in deviation. It is our view that there should be a uniform compensation mechanism that also includes some incentive towards wear and tear of the power plant equipment for helping the grid in maintaining and
	= 49.90Hz (II)(i) @ zero when [50.05 Hz < f < 50.10 Hz]:	keeping the frequency more stable. At the very least, the compensation receivable by the Seller in case of



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	Provided that such seller shall pay @ 10% of RR	over injection should be equal to the charges payable
	when [$f \ge 50.10 \text{ Hz}$]	by the Seller in case of under injection during the
	(II)(ii) @115 % of RR when $[f < 49.90 Hz]$	following scenarios:
	Deviation by way of under injection (For Deviation up to [10% D _{GS} or 100 MW, whichever is less])	 (I) For Deviation up to [10% D_{GS} or 100 MW, whichever is less] and f within f_{band}: When [50.00 Hz < f ≤50.05 Hz],
	(I)(iv) @ RR when $f = 50.00 \text{ Hz}$ (I)(v) When [50.00 Hz < $f \le 50.05 \text{ Hz}$], for every increase in f by 0.01 Hz, charges for deviation for such seller shall be reduced by 3% of RR so that charges for deviation become 85% of RR when $f = 50.05 \text{Hz}$	 When [49.90 ≤ f < 50.00 Hz] (II) For Deviation up to [10% DGs or 100 MW, whichever is less] and f outside f_{band}: When [f < 49.90 Hz]
	(I)(vi) (When [49.90 $\leq f < 50.00 \text{ Hz}$], for every decrease in f by 0.01 Hz, charges for deviation for such seller shall be increased by 5% of RR so that charges for deviation become 150% of RR when f = 49.90Hz	
	(II)(iii) @ 85% of RR when $f > 50.05$ Hz (II)(iv) @ 150 % of RR when $[f < 49.90$ Hz]	
	(11)(17) = 1.50 % 0 of KK when [1 < 49.90 Hz]	



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3.	Clause 8 (1) – Charges for Deviation	The draft defines frequency limit as f<50.10 Hz for
		this clause. However, considering a scenario when the
	(III) For Deviation beyond [10% DGS or 100 MW,	frequency is in the lower range (f<49.90 for example),
	whichever is less] and f within and outside f band	the seller should be incentivized even if they are over-
		injecting by more than 10% of the schedule as they are
	(i) Such seller shall be paid back @ zero when ($f < 50.10$	supporting the grid.
	Hz): Provided that such seller shall pay @ 10% of RR	Accordingly, in such instances, the charges for
	when $[f \ge 50.10 \text{ Hz}]$	deviation to be receivable by Seller shall be increased
		by 5% of RR so that the charges for deviation becomes
		150% of RR when $f \le 49.90$ Hz.
4.	Clause 8 (1) – Charges for Deviation	The draft defines frequency limit as $f \ge 50.00$ Hz for
		this clause. However, considering the scenario when f
	(III) For Deviation beyond [10% DGS or 100 MW,	is in the higher range [f $<$ 50.05], the seller should be
	whichever is less] and f within and outside f band	incentivized even if they are under-injecting by more
		than 10% of the schedule as they are supporting the
	(ii) Such seller shall pay (a) RR when [$f \ge 50.00 \text{ Hz}$]	grid.
		Accordingly, in such instances, the charges for
		deviation to be payable by Seller should be reduced by
		3% of RR so that the charges for deviation become
		85% of RR when $f = 50.05$ Hz (similar to 8 (I)(v))



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5.	Clause 8 (1) – Charges for Deviation	These penalties are very high and it is requested that the penalties should be @125 % of RR and @150% of
	(III) For Deviation beyond [10% DGS or 100 MW,	RR respectively in place of @150% of RR and @200
	whichever is less] and f within and outside f band	% of RR.
	Seller to pay @:	
	(iii) @ 150% of RR when [49.90Hz $\leq f < 50.00$ Hz]; and	
	(<i>iv</i>) @ 200% of RR when [f < 49.90 Hz]	
6.	Clause 8 (2)	It is requested that he charges payable by seller in case
		of under injection beyond [15% DGS or 150 MW,
	Charges for Deviation, in respect to general seller being	whichever is less] should be @105 % of RR in place
	an RoR generating station, shall be without any linkage	of @110% of RR.
	to grid frequency, as under:	
	(v) @ 110% of RR for deviation beyond [15% DGS or 150	
	MW, whichever is less].	
7.	Clause 8 (12)	Collective transaction cannot be revised if the
		generator is under forced shutdown. Therefore, the
	(12) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (1) to	charges for deviation for collective transaction may be
	(5) of this Regulation, in case of forced outage of a seller,	



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	the charges for deviation shall be @ the reference charge	kept @ reference charge rate for the entire period of
	rate for a maximum duration of eight time blocks or until	forced shutdown.
	the revision of its schedule, whichever is earlier.	
8.	General Comment	For deviation beyond 10% of the D_{GS} , clarification is
		required whether the calculation will be incremental
		as per the previous DSM policy?
		Illustration- if the schedule is 200MW and the
		generation is 230MW (considering $f \ge 50.00$ Hz) will
		the penalty as per clause 8(III)(ii) be on 30MW or only
		on 10MW.